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ABSTRACT
Just  Health is an ambitious book, in which Norman Daniels  attempts to 
bring together in a single framework all his work on health and justice from 
the past 25 years. One major aim is to reconcile  his earlier work on the 
special  moral  importance of healthcare with his  later work on the social 
determinants of health. In his earlier work, Daniels argued that healthcare is 
of  special  moral  importance because it  protects  opportunity.  In this  later 
work, Daniels argues that the social determinants of health (which in fact 
tend to have a larger effect on health outcomes than healthcare does) should 
also be considered special. This paper argues that it is a mistake to base a 
theory  of  justice  for  health  on  the  claim  that  health  (or  the  social 
determinants of health) are ‘special’, for three reasons. First, once we realise 
that  health  is  to  a  large  part  socially  determined  by  features  such  as 
distribution of income, which are also of independent importance for justice, 
we cannot  talk  about  a  theory of  justice  for  health  in  isolation  from an 
overall theory of justice. Second, when we are trying to work out the place 
of health in a general theory of justice, being told that health (or the social 
determinants of health) is special is unhelpful. The relevant starting point 
should rather be whether health matters in a fundamental way for justice, or 
whether it matters merely for the effects it has on those goods which are of 
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fundamental importance for justice. Third, treating the social determinants 
of health as special would in fact be counterproductive in terms of the broad 
approach to justice Daniels favours. 
INTRODUCTION
Just Health [1] is an ambitious book, in which Norman Daniels attempts to 
bring together in a single framework all his work on health and justice from 
the past 25 years. The obvious question is whether the whole is equal to the 
sum of the parts.  I  shall  argue that, at  least  when it  comes to the social 
determinants  of  health,  it  is  rather  less.  The extensions  to  his  theory  of 
justice  in  healthcare  which  Daniels  makes  to  take  account  of  the  social 
determinants of health end up revealing that his approach to justice in health 
and healthcare is deeply flawed. 
I  shall  proceed  as  follows.  First  I  shall  briefly  distinguish  health,  
healthcare  and  the  social  determinants  of  health,  and  will  attempt  to 
elucidate what Daniels means by special moral importance. Second, I give a 
brief  exposition  of  Daniels’ account  of  the  special  moral  importance  of 
healthcare in his earlier work Just Health Care.[2] Third, I explain why (as 
Daniels acknowledges) the literature on the social determinants of health 
reveals an important problem with this argument, and explain how Daniels 
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attempts  to  extend  his  ‘specialness’  argument  so  that  it  is  not  only 
healthcare,  but also health and the social determinants of health which are 
said to be special. Finally,  I argue that it is a mistake to base a theory of 
justice for health  on the claim that health  (or the social  determinants of 
health) are ‘special’, for three reasons. First, once we realise that health is to 
a large part socially determined by features such as distribution of income – 
which are also of independent importance for justice – we cannot talk about 
a theory of justice for health in isolation from an overall theory of justice. 
Second, when we are trying to work out the place of health in a general 
theory of justice, being told that health (or the social determinants of health) 
is special is unhelpful. The relevant starting point should rather be whether 
health matters in a fundamental way for justice, or whether it matters merely 
for the effects it has on those goods which are of fundamental importance 
for justice. Third, treating the social determinants  of health as special would 
in  fact  be  counterproductive  in  terms  of  the  broad  approach  to  justice 
Daniels favours. 
DEFINING TERMS
Daniels argues that we should define health as the “absence of... deviation 
from the natural functional organization of a typical member of a 
species.”[3] Various factors will determine how healthy a given individual 
is. Clearly, genetic factors will often play a role, as will exposure to 
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communicable diseases. This article focuses on the role of healthcare and of 
the social determinants of health. By healthcare I mean, roughly, 
interventions by qualified professionals with the aim of either restoring 
health (for example, prescribing a drug), or preventing damage to health (for 
example, provision of safe-sex advice; or dietary advice to people at risk of 
developing type-2 diabetes). 
By the social determinants of health I mean, roughly, all those factors 
which  affect  health  and (a)  have  a  social  and systemic  as  opposed to  a 
natural  or  episodic  cause,  and  (b)  fall  outside  the  narrow  sphere  of 
healthcare.  The  social  determinants  of  health  include,  for  instance, 
workplace  stress,  social  exclusion,  and  the  inequality  of  distribution  of 
income in society [4], but not the provision of medical treatment. There will 
of  course  be  some  grey  areas  where  we  are  unsure  whether  to  class 
something as healthcare or as a social determinant of health. But nothing in 
what  follows  depends  on  drawing  such  a  sharp  distinction.  (Indeed  my 
argument  is  compatible  with  the  claim  that  all  healthcare  should  be 
classified as social determinants of health.) 
One thing which will prove crucial in what follows is the idea of “special 
moral  importance”  (specialness  for  short).  In  Just  Health  Care,  Daniels 
frequently talks about the specialness of healthcare, and in  Just Health  he 
broadens his focus so that it is not just healthcare, but also health itself and 
the  social  determinants  of  health  which  are  said  to  be  of  special  moral 
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importance. When elucidating what he means by the question of whether 
health or healthcare is of special moral importance, Daniels makes claims 
like the following:
My focus on the question [of whether health is of special 
moral importance] then and now is driven by the common 
observation that people who tolerate vast inequalities in wealth 
and power are often morally outraged when those who are ill 
cannot get care because they cannot pay for it. People who 
emphatically reject the general Marxist distributive principle, 
“From each according to his ability, to each according to his 
needs,” embrace at least the second part of it when applied to 
health care.[5]
However nowhere does Daniels give a precise account of what is entailed 
by the claim that something is of special moral importance in his sense. 
Segall, in a helpful recent article puts forward the following account of what 
it is to treat healthcare as special, which seems to have Daniels’s agreement. 
On this view, to say that healthcare is special “is to imply that health care 
resources ought to be allocated in isolation from the distributions of other 
social goods.”[6] It follows from this that “Poor people’s entitlement to 
health care must not be restricted on account of their inferior financial 
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standing. But ... it also forbids discriminating against the rich in access to 
medical care. More generally, the specialness thesis forbids discriminating 
against members of society who are relatively well off with regard to goods 
other than health. This is part of what it means to allocate health care in 
isolation from other distributions.”[7] 
In default of any other account, I shall assume that this is the best way to 
interpret Daniels. Regardless of whether this is the right way to interpret 
Daniels, it is clear that he does not think that to claim that health, healthcare 
or the social determinants of health are of special moral importance is to 
claim that health, healthcare or the social determinants of health matter for 
justice for their own sake. For he explicitly argues against the claim that we 
should consider health to be a primary good: “The special importance and 
unequal  distribution  of  health-care  needs,  like  educational  needs,  are 
acknowledged by connecting the needs to institutions that provide for fair 
equality  of  opportunity.  But  opportunity,  not  health  care  or  education 
remains  the  primary  social  good.”[8]  Hence  on  Daniels’s  account 
opportunity matters in its own right for justice, but health matters only for 
the effect it has on opportunity.
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DANIELS’S ARGUMENT FOR THE 
SPECIALNESS OF HEALTHCARE
In  Just  Health  Care Daniels  argues  that  the  correct  explanation  of  the 
common intuition that there is something ‘special’ about healthcare is the 
protective  effect  that  healthcare  has  on  opportunity.  Crucially,  Daniels 
argues that a commitment to equal opportunities commits us to two things: 
first  that each person should have a fair share of the normal  opportunity 
range,  where  the  normal  opportunity  range  is  “the  array  of  life  plans 
reasonable  persons  in  [a  given  society]  are  likely  to  construct  for 
themselves”.[9] Second, that a person’s fair share of the opportunity range is 
determined  by  their  talents  and  skills  alone.  Given  these  assumptions, 
Daniels argues that we should see disease and disability as limitations on a 
person’s normal opportunity range. In short, health is a necessary condition 
for a person’s being able to access the normal opportunity range for their 
talents,  healthcare  protects  health,  and  therefore  a  commitment  to  fair 
equality of opportunity commits us to treating healthcare as ‘special’. 
There are a number of objections that one might make to this argument. 
First,  it  is far from obvious that it  is a commitment to equal opportunity 
rather  than  anything  else,  which  provides  the  best  explanation  for  the 
common  intuition  that  there  is  something  special  about  healthcare.[10] 
8
Moreover the way we currently distribute our health care budgets is very 
different from what Daniels’s approach would commit us to: as Segall puts 
it,  “Most  patients  treated  by  health  care  systems  are  individuals  in  the 
twilight  of  their  lives...  An often-cited  figure is  that,  in  the US,  30% of 
health care expenditure is currently spent on patients in the last six months 
of their life... Health care in that case cannot be said to provide opportunity, 
equal or otherwise, to pursue life plans. The effect of successful treatment of 
patients who are in the last weeks of their lives is not so much that of giving 
them opportunity to pursue their life plans, but rather that of alleviating their 
pain and suffering and that of postponing death as long as possible.”[11]
But I shall leave these problems on one side here in order to focus on a 
different problem. Daniels’s argument implicitly assumes that healthcare is 
the  major factor which affects  health.  However  this claim is  false.  Even 
countries like the UK that have a nationalised healthcare system which is 
free at the point of access show a large socioeconomic gradient in health, so 
clearly equal access to healthcare can only be one factor in overall health 
achievement.  And as  Daniels  now acknowledges,  a  large  body of  social 
sciences  literature  has  shown  that  factors  like  how  hierarchical  our 
workplaces  are,  how  much  social  capital  there  is  in  society,  and  how 
unequal incomes are all have a major impact on health: “Health is produced 
not just by having access to treatment, but to a measurably great extent, by 
the cumulative experience of social conditions across the lifecourse. When a 
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60 year old patient presents to the  emergency room with a heart attack to 
receive medical treatment,  that encounter  represents the results  of bodily 
insults  that  accumulated  over  a  lifetime.  Medical  care  is,  figuratively 
speaking, ‘the ambulance at the bottom of the cliff.’”[12] So if we want to 
protect health we need to focus on issues such as the way we work, and the 
levels of income inequality in society, in addition to ensuring fair access to 
healthcare.[13,14]
DANIELS’S NEW ACCOUNT OF THE VALUE OF 
HEALTH
Clearly if Daniels’s justification for taking  healthcare to be special is that 
healthcare protects health, and that health is necessary for the enjoyment of 
a normal opportunity range, then parity of reasoning would suggest that he 
should take the social determinants of health to be special, given that both 
equally  determine  opportunity.  And  this  is  what  Daniels  does.  In  Just  
Health, healthcare is taken to be “but one among a broader set of health 
needs.”[15] And whilst the earlier work refers only to healthcare as special, 
Just Health broadens things out so that both health and health needs (which 
include those health needs identified by the social determinants of health 
literature) are now also deemed to be special.
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But the claim that the social determinants of health are special is much 
more  problematic  than  Daniels  seems  to  realise.  Treating  healthcare as 
special implies focusing separately on the allocation of healthcare, to ensure 
that other factors (such as how rich someone is) do not adversely affect their 
healthcare provision. Treating healthcare as special in this way could  make 
for  a  reasonable  policy.  Given  that  healthcare  is  valued  only  for  its 
contribution to health, it can reasonably be allocated in isolation from other 
goods. However the social determinants of health are not valued solely for 
their  contribution  to  health.  For  example,  the  distribution  of  incomes  in 
society is an important social determinant  of health;  but clearly we have 
justice-based reasons to care about the distribution of incomes which are not 
reducible to the effect that such distributions have on health. 
It follows that treating income as special in virtue of its effects on health 
would  require  us  to  override  distributions  of  incomes  which  would 
otherwise have been just, in order to ensure desired distributions of health. 
Treating income as special would require us to identify and to implement a 
just  distribution  of  incomes-as-they-affect-health  separately  from  the 
question of  what  a  just  distribution  of  incomes considered on their  own 
would be. But this seems implausible. Even if we were sure that a particular 
distribution  of  incomes  was  necessary  to  bring  about  a  certain  desired 
pattern of health outcomes in a population, it would be a further question 
about whether justice required us to institute this distribution of incomes. 
11
For  there  are  goods  other  than  health  which  are  important  from  the 
perspective of justice, and doing something that imposes a particular pattern 
of  health  outcomes  will  only  sometimes  coincide  with what  justice  tout  
court recommends.
Someone  might  think  that  health  is  so  important  that  all  the  social 
determinants of health should be allocated separately in such a way as to 
bring  about  a  certain  desired  distribution  of  health  (even  where  other 
legitimate  goals  would  recommend  distributing  these  goods  in  different 
ways). But even if they did believe that health was appropriately valued in 
this  way,  the  resulting  policy  would  be  unattractive  for  a  Rawlsian 
egalitarian liberal like Daniels. As Segall explains, the claim that health is 
special “mandates that entitlement to health care should not be curtailed due 
to  inferior  or  superior  wealth.  ...  But  while  this  feature  (‘working  both 
ways’)  appears  attractive  when  it  comes  to  medical  care,  it  appears 
considerably less attractive with regard to the other social determinants of 
health. Egalitarians typically do want to allocate more (social bases of) self-
respect to those who have less of other goods (for example income, looks) 
and conversely, allocate more income to those who have smaller bundles 
(compared to others) of other social  (and natural) assets. But treating the 
social determinants of health as special prohibits this.”[16] 
Despite his claim that we should treat the social determinants of health as 
special, Daniels in fact seems to deny the position that this would commit 
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him to. Not only does he deny that health is the most important good that a 
just society should be aiming at; he also denies that health should be a direct 
goal of justice. (As we said, he thinks that health is important for its effects 
on opportunity, and not for its own sake.) So it seems that there is a deep 
tension in Daniels’s account of health and justice: he is committed both to 
the claim (a) that health is not a primary good and as such not itself part of 
what it is for a distribution to be just, and (b) the claim that health is special, 
and should set limits on what it is for a distribution to be just. 
The broader  point  is  that  once we acknowledge that health  has social 
determinants, which we have reason to care about for their own sake from 
the perspective of justice, quite apart from the effect they have on health, we 
cannot construct a theory of justice for health in isolation from a general 
theory of justice. Rather we need to embed our theory of justice for health in 
a broader general theory of justice, as Daniels acknowledges:
The premise of the pun in the title of Just Health Care was 
that I could explain what justice required in health care without 
talking about all of social justice. I only had to appeal to 
widespread agreement with the importance of equality of 
opportunity. In Just Health, that premise is undermined...[17]
 Once we realise this, describing health (and the social determinants of 
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health) as special does not seem very helpful, as it fudges a key question 
about how justice in health is related to a broader general theory of justice. 
What we need to know is how we should weigh health against other goods, 
such as income, liberty and the social bases of self-respect. Being told that 
health is special  gives us little or no guidance,  given that all  these other 
goods are clearly important too. 
From the perspective of justice we should care fundamentally about only 
those things which are of fundamental importance for justice, and we should 
care about other things only for the effect that they have on things that are of  
fundamental importance for justice. So a better place to start would be to 
ask whether health is of fundamental importance for justice, or does health 
matter only because of the effect that health has on other goods which are of 
fundamental importance for justice? As I see it this leaves Daniels with a 
choice. If he really wants to make good on the somewhat murky claim that 
health is special, then he should commit himself to the claim that health is a 
primary  social  good,  which  matters  for  its  own sake  when  it  comes  to 
constructing a just society. Staying within the broadly Rawlsian framework 
within which he works, he could introduce the social bases of health as an 
additional Rawlsian primary good.[18] 
This seems a reasonable extension of Rawls’ theory, given that Rawls 
himself  allows that health  is equally as important a good as the primary 
goods  which  his  theory  of  justice  picks  out  to  be  distributed  fairly.[19] 
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Whilst Rawls denies that we should treat health as one of the primary goods, 
he does so on the grounds (a) that health is ‘natural’ rather than a social 
good (meaning that it is much less closely affected affected by changes in 
the basic structure of society than are the genuine primary goods such as 
rights, liberties and opportunities, income and wealth, and the social bases 
of self-respect), and (b) his theory of justice concerns only the justice of the 
basic  structure  of  society.[20]  This  was  a  reasonable  view of  health  for 
Rawls to hold in 1971, but the mass of literature produced on the social  
determinants of health over the past thirty years has clearly demonstrated 
that (a) is false. Whilst Rawls seems never to have revised his views to take 
into account the social  determinants of health,  and promote health to the 
status  of  a  primary  good,  this  would  be  an  obvious  option  for  anyone 
thinking about health and justice now.
Daniels suggests two reasons for resisting such a move, neither of which 
is convincing. The first is that if we increase our list of primary goods above 
those proposed by Rawls, we are likely to lose our overlapping consensus 
that these goods really are needs for living the life of a citizen. The second is 
that the more primary goods we have, the more difficult it will be to work 
out who is worst off. The first claim is unconvincing as a reason for thinking 
for  refusing  to  treat  health  as  a  primary  good,  given  that  health  is  not 
contentious in this way. The second is  also unconvincing,  given that the 
problem of  indexing occurs  whenever  we are trying to  reconcile  two or 
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more  incommensurable  goods,  and will  be  a  problem for  Rawls’ theory 
whether  or  not  we  add  health  to  the  list  of  primary  goods  (as  Daniels 
himself acknowledges).[21] Daniels does not provide an argument for why 
working out who is worst off, measured according to six incommensurable 
goods, will be significantly more difficult than doing so on the basis of five.
It might be that Daniels’s real reason for objecting to health as a primary 
good is that he does not think that health is sufficiently important to merit 
this; that ultimately health is not of direct relevance for justice. If this is his 
view,  he  should  explicitly  adopt  what  Fabienne Peter  calls  an  “indirect” 
approach  to  health  and  justice:  namely  one  where  we  focus  on  making 
society as just  as possible  in conventional  Rawlsian terms and then take 
injustices in health to be those that derive from social conditions which we 
have a prior reason for believing to be unjust.[22] Either way, framing his 
account in terms of the special moral importance of health merely muddies 
the waters.
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CONCLUSION
Whilst Daniels is to be congratulated for bringing the normative relevance 
of the literature on the social determinants of health to the attention of many 
in  bioethics,  the  account  of  justice  in  health  he  arrives  at  is  deeply 
problematic. Given that (as Daniels now acknowledges) we need a theory of 
justice  for  health  and  healthcare  which  is  continuous  with  our  general 
theories of justice, I suggest that it would be better to go back to the drawing  
board  and  start  from  the  clearer  question  of  whether  health  is  of 
fundamental importance for justice than to continue to place any store by 
the question of whether health is ‘special’.
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